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1 Introduction 
1.1 Purpose 
Throughout history there have always been people who have had to leave their countries of 
origin because of war, generalized violence, persecution, or just in search of a better life for 
oneself and one’s family. In recent years there has been a great influx of people trying to 
enter Europe both legally and irregularly, and migration and asylum policies have therefore 
become increasingly important to European governments. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to consider whether a specific part of European Union 
legislation, namely the Dublin II Regulation, is in full compliance with the principle of 
non-refoulement, which is seen as a cornerstone in international refugee law. The 
prohibition against refoulement provides refugees and asylum seekers with protection 
against being forcibly refouled or returned to a state where he or she might be subjected to 
persecution, torture or other ill-treatment. The Regulation will thus be considered in 
connection with fundamental human rights treaties to which the member states are parties, 
with a special emphasis on the European Convention of Human Rights
1
 and its 
understanding of the principle after article 3 of the Convention, due to its significant impact 
on European Union (hereafter EU) law.  
 
In the first part of this thesis the common European framework on asylum and the Dublin 
Regulation will be briefly presented, followed by a legal analysis of the principle of non-
refoulement as it has been developed and thus its impact on the obligations of the 
contracting states. The Dublin Regulation is an essential part of the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS), aiming at providing harmonized standards to ensure equal 
protection of refugees and asylum seekers throughout the Union. As the purpose of this 
                                                 
 
1
 Council of Europe: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
1950 (hereafter ECHR) 
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thesis is to examine the compliance of the Dublin Regulation, the other legislative 
instruments of the CEAS and their possible deficiencies in relation to the principle of non-
refoulement will not be considered.  
The Dublin II Regulation is a mechanism that sets out the criteria for determining the 
member state responsible for examining an application for asylum submitted in one of the 
member states by a third-country national, aiming at ensuring that only one member state 
examine the individual’s claim for asylum, and the system therefore facilitates transfers and 
returns of asylum seekers between the member states. The Regulation is based on the 
presumption that all member states live up to the standards of international human rights 
treaties and consequently can be considered as safe countries for third-country nationals, 
hence the transfer system as such will not be able to directly or indirectly violate the 
principle of non-refoulement. Since all of the member states of the European Union are 
parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, thus obligated to preserve and respect the fundamental 
human rights provisions they contain, it might appear to be a valid presumption to 
automatically consider the EU member states as safe countries for asylum seekers.   
 
However, ten years after it entered into force, the Regulation has been widely criticised and 
has displayed significant deficiencies regarding its unfortunate impact on those who are 
transferred in accordance with it. An examination of certain issues with the Regulation in 
connection to the possible violation on non-refoulement will thus be carried out, focusing 
primarily on the issues relating to mutual trust expressed by the safe country presumption, 
and the Regulation’s failure to serve as a burden-sharing instrument as well as the lack of 
procedural safeguards for those who are transferred pursuant to the Regulation secondary. 
The main focus will be on the responsibilities of the sending state to avoid further arbitrary 
refoulement as a result of its decision to transfer an asylum seeker to another member state, 
and will consequently mainly concern the possible indirect violation of the prohibition of 
refoulement in accordance with how the principle is interpreted in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (ECtHR) case law. More specifically this pertains to a situation in which an 
asylum seeker fears that her return to another member state would put her at risk of being 
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further refouled to a territory in which she might be subjected to torture or other ill-
treatment, without having the opportunity to have the merits of her claim for asylum 
properly considered by either the sending, nor the receiving member state. Furthermore, as 
the recent jurisprudence from the two European Courts has demonstrated, transfers 
pursuant to “Dublin” procedures to certain member states are also able to directly violate 
the principle of non-refoulement, and an analysis of the relevant case law of the ECtHR 
and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) will consequently be conducted in 
regard to both indirect and direct infringements of the prohibition against refoulement 
when this follows as a consequence of “Dublin” transfers in order to determine the member 
states responsibilities. 
 
As the deficiencies of the system have also been acknowledged by the EU legislators, a 
recast of the Regulation is currently being discussed in the different institutions, and has so 
far been agreed upon politically.
2
 Albeit the revised proposal appears to address many of 
the most pressing issues of the Regulation, by for instance introducing the right to a 
personal interview and access to effective appeal against a transfer-decision with the right 
to remain on the territory while the competent authorities decide whether or not its 
enforcement should be suspended, several others remain unresolved. This applies 
especially to the lack of a burden-sharing mechanism as well as the absence of legal 
requirements regarding temporary suspension of transfers in situations of non-compliance 
with the other CEAS instruments by certain member states, which were originally proposed 
by the Commission but has not been endorsed by the European Council.
3
 
The proposed amendments will thus be examined in connection with the current provisions, 
and their ability to provide adequate protection against refoulement will be considered. 
                                                 
 
2
 Irish Presidency of the Council of the European Union, press release: Minister Shatter presents Presidency 
priorities in the JHA area to European Parliament, 22.01.2013 
3
 European Council, doc 7010/12, 2.3.2012 
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2 The legal background of the Dublin Regulation 
2.1 Towards a Common European Asylum System 
Before conducting a legal analysis of the Dublin II Regulation, the Regulation and its 
background and legal context will first be presented. The Dublin Regulation is part of the 
EU’s common legal framework on asylum, which prior to the 1980’s did not appear to be 
high on what was then the European Community’s (EC) agenda. The signing of the 
Schengen agreement between Germany, France and the Benelux countries in 1985, which 
was originally an intergovernmental process outside the EC, nevertheless became the 
beginning of what was to become a common European approach to migration.
4
 In 1990 the 
first Dublin Convention
5
 was signed, and was like the Schengen agreement at the time 
based outside the Community aquis. Since the Schengen agreement removed internal 
border controls and the Single European Act6 provided the free movement of people, 
goods, services and capital, thus allowing persons to move relatively unrestricted between 
member states, the purpose of the Dublin Convention then was to decide how to determine 
which state party should be responsible for considering an asylum claim where the 
applicant had travelled through more than one state.  
 
Asylum matters were first formally introduced to the EC institutional framework, which 
now had become the EU, with the Maastricht treaty
7
 where it was named one of nine 
“matters of common interest” in Justice and Home Affairs, and was supposed to ensure that 
developments on the area were be in compliance with the ECHR and the Geneva 
                                                 
 
4
 Schengen Agreement, OJ L 239 , 22/09/2000 P. 0013 - 0018, 42000A0922(01) 
5
 Dublin Convention, 15.06.1990, Official Journal C 254, 19/08/1997 p. 0001 - 0012 
6
 European Community: Single European Act, OJ  L 169, 29.06.1987 
7
 Treaty on European Union, OJ C 191, 29.7.1992 
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Convention.8 Compliance with international and regional human rights treaties on the area 
has thus been an important aim of the EU asylum system from the beginning. 
 
In 1997 the treaty of Amsterdam,9 which amended the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, became an 
important step in the development of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). The 
Treaty formally integrated the Schengen aquis in the EU and determined that the Union 
within a period of five years was to adopt measures and mechanisms on asylum policy, 
including common rules on determining the member state responsible for considering an 
application for asylum submitted by a national of a third-country in one of the member 
states,10 thus initiating the revision and adaption of the Dublin Convention in the EU 
framework. The Union also decided to adopt common minimum standards on reception 
conditions and procedures relating to asylum applications, as well as a common minimum 
standard on the determination of refugee status.11 The purpose was to establish an area of 
“freedom, security and justice.”12 
 
After several discussions within the EU, the four following legislative instruments were 
adopted mainly within the agreed timeframe, thus concluding the first phase of CEAS: The 
Reception Conditions directive,13 the Dublin Regulation,14 the Asylum Qualifications 
directive,15 and the Asylum Procedures directive.16  
                                                 
 
8
 Christian Kaunert and Sarah Léonard: The European Union asylum policy after the treaty of Lisbon and the 
Stockholm programme: Towards supranational governance in a common area of protection? Refugee Survey 
Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 1–20 
9
 European Union: The Treaty of Amsterdam, OJ C 340, 10.11.1997 
10
 Ibid, article 63(1) 
11
 Ibid 
12
 Ibid article 61(b-d) 
13
 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January, OJ L 31/18, 06.02.2003  
14
Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003/EC of 18 February 2003, OJ L 050 , 25.02.2003 
15
 Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004, OJ L 304/12, 30.09.2004 
16
 Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December, OJ L 326/13, 13.12.2005 
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As the purpose of this thesis is to consider the compliance of the Dublin Regulation, the 
other three legal acts constituting the CEAS will not be assessed further, but might rather 
serve as a supplement to understanding the Dublin Regulation when necessary. 
 
In the second phase the CEAS was, according to the Hague programme, supposed to move 
forward going beyond the minimum standards and establish a common asylum procedure 
and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum or subsidiary protection.17 The first 
phase measures were evaluated by 2007, which resulted in the Policy Plan on Asylum 
presented by the Commission,18 which pointed out three main strands of the CEAS; 
legislative harmonization, practical cooperation, and solidarity amongst Member States,19 
and pushed the deadline for the implementation of the CEAS to be done by the end of 
2012. The evaluation also showed that about 11.5 % of all asylum applications that were 
lodged in the “Dublin” area were subjected to transfer requests pursuant to the Regulation, 
which displays that the Regulation is not without impact on the situation for asylum seekers 
in the Union.
20
 
 
The Hague programme was then subsequently followed by the Stockholm programme, 
which contained the policy plan for the period of 2010-2014. The program reaffirms the 
Dublin system’s role as a cornerstone in building the CEAS, and maintains the 
commitment to create an area of equal protection and solidarity.
21
 The Programme also 
continues the approach of attempting to strike a balance between high level of protection 
for asylum seekers on one side, and to effectively prevent, combat and control illegal 
                                                 
 
17
 European Council: The Hague Programme, OJ C 53/1, 03.03.2005, 1.3 paragraph 1 
18
Commission of the European Communities: Policy Plan on Asylum – An Integrated Approach to Protection 
across the EU, COM(2008) 360, 17.06.2008 
19
Kaunert, note 8, p. 14 
20
 European Commission: Report on the evaluation of the Dublin system, COM(2007) 299 final, 6.6.2007 
21
 European Council: The Stockholm Programme, OJ C 115/1, 4.5.2010, p. 32 
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immigration as well as preventing abuse of the asylum system on the other.
22
 Albeit at least 
some of the EU institutions had to be aware of the deteriorating standards of the asylum 
systems of some of the member states at the time,
23
 the principle of mutual trust remains 
the basis for cooperation in the area. Furthermore, the policy plan did not appear to 
challenge the Dublin Regulation’s suitability to function as an instrument of a system 
which is supposed to promote burden-sharing and solidarity, despite the emergence of 
reports by international organisations and the evaluation of the European Parliament itself 
concluding otherwise.
24
  
 
With the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the relevant provisions in asylum matters in 
the main treaties are now article 78 TEU, which is the legal basis for the CEAS, stressing 
the importance of compliance with the Geneva Convention and the principle of non-
refoulement, and article 80 TEU reiterating the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility among member states.
25
 
Finally, as a result of the evaluation and consultations, the four legislative instruments of 
the first phase have been revised, whereas in the time of writing, the recast of the Asylum 
Qualifications directive has been formally adopted,26 the recasts of the Reception 
Conditions Directive and the Dublin Regulation have been agreed upon politically, and the 
negotiations of the Asylum Procedures Directive is yet to be finalized.27 The revised 
proposal for the new Dublin III Regulation will thus be seen in connection with the current 
provisions when examined further in this thesis. 
                                                 
 
22
 Ibid, p. 5 
23
 See for instance Case C-72/06, Commission v. Greece (2007), ECR I- 00057. 
24
 European Parliament: Resolution 2/9/2008 on the evaluation of the Dublin system, (2007/2262(INI)), point 
M. 
25
See European Union: Consolidated versions of Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(CFREU) (as amended by the Lisbon Treaty) OJ C 83/47, 30.3.2010 
26
 Directive 2011/95/EU, OJ L 337/9, 20.12.2011 
27
 See Irish Presidency, note 2 
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2.2 Purpose and criteria of the Dublin II Regulation 
The purpose of the Regulations is to set out the criteria and mechanisms for determining 
the member state responsible for examining an application for asylum submitted in one of 
the member states by a third-country national.28 All the current 27 member states of the EU 
are bound by the Regulation, as well as Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland 
through special agreements. Therefore, when referring to the Dublin Regulation, Norway, 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland are also included in the term “member states”, as 
they are parties to the Regulation, albeit without being members of the EU. 
As with the Dublin Convention, the Regulation aims at prohibiting asylum seekers from 
lodging applications in several different member states hoping to be accepted somewhere, 
or so-called asylum shopping, and avoiding “refugees in orbit”, meaning asylum seekers 
who were sent from one state to another as no state appeared to be willing to consider their 
application.29 Where one of the main issues with the 1990 Convention was to determine the 
identity of the refugee and his previous travel route, the Eurodac system of collection and 
comparison of fingerprints30 was established to make the application of the Dublin system 
more effective.  
 
The Dublin Regulation consists of two kinds of criteria, namely the ones that allocate 
responsibility for the examination of the asylum application, and those who decide transfer 
and reversal of asylum seekers.31  
The first kinds of criteria after the Dublin Regulation is set out in Chapter III of the 
Regulation and are objective and hierarchal, where the basis of the examination of which 
member state is responsible for the asylum application is determined on the account of the 
situation obtaining when the asylum seeker first lodged his application with a member 
state. In many instances the asylum seeker has crossed the border irregularly or has arrived 
                                                 
 
28
 Dublin Regulation, note 14, article 1 
29
 Kaunert, note 8, p. 17 
30
 Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000, OJ L 316/1, 15.12.2000 
31
 Øyvind Dybvik Øyen (red): Lærebok i utlendingsrett, Universitetsforlaget (2013), p. 448 
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at the border without the necessary documents, in which case the first member state the 
asylum seeker enters is the one responsible for considering the application.32 This is often 
referred to as the “first country of asylum” principle, and applies usually in situations 
where there are no other factors to determine which country is best suited to handle the 
application.  
 
In situations where there are such other factors in determining where the asylum 
application should be examined, these factors could be decisive for the applicant. 
For instance, articles 6-8 concern situations where the applicant has family in a member 
state, and can all be seen as results of the respect of family unity, which is described as an 
important consideration in the Regulation’s preamble.33 Furthermore article 9 decides that 
if an applicant has a valid residence permit, the member state who issued the document is 
responsible for the examination of the application. Due to the hierarchy of the rules set out 
in the Regulation itself,
34
 the provisions in articles 6-9 are lex superior and therefore take 
precedence over the general “first country of asylum” principle in article 10. There are 
however two significant exceptions from these criteria, namely the discretionary clauses 
based on sovereignty in article 3(2) and humanitarian considerations in article 15. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
32
 Dublin Regulation, note 14, article 10 (1) 
33
 Ibid, preamble (6) 
34
 Ibid, article 5(1) 
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Since “Dublin II” is meant to make one and only one member state responsible for the 
individual asylum application, if an analysis of the criteria for responsibility described 
above displays that another member state than the stat the asylum seeker is currently in is 
responsible for his claim, that state can then request that the responsible one to “take back” 
or “takes charge” of the applicant and thus the examination of his application.35 The 
Regulation therefore contains a right for the sending state to transfer, but nevertheless not 
an obligation, as the sovereignty clause of article 3(2) of the Regulation allows the member 
states to consider an application albeit it does not have the responsibility to do so. On the 
other hand, the receiving state is obligated to accept the transfer if it indeed is responsible 
pursuant to the provisions of the Regulation. 
 
                                                 
 
35
 Ibid, article 16 
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3 The legal impact of other international treaties on European 
Union law 
Several of the legal instruments which constitute the CEAS have mentioned the importance 
of full compliance with international human rights obligations, such as the ones from the 
Geneva Convention. However, the supremacy of what at the time was Community law over 
national law and obligations was established in the case of Costa v. ENEL,36 and questions 
could therefore be asked regarding the formal impact of such human rights treaties on 
secondary legislation such as the Dublin Regulation. In the mentioned case, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) found that "the transfer by the States from their domestic legal 
system to the Community legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the 
Treaty carries with it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights…”37 Yet this does not 
apply to all international instruments, as the issue is moreover addressed in article 351 (1) 
(307 TEC) of the TFEU38 which establishes that international obligations the member states 
adopted before 1958 will not be affected by the treaty. It has furthermore been established 
in case law that the application of Union law will not affect the member states obligations 
to respect the rights of a third-country under a previous agreement.39 However, after article 
351 (2), if the agreements are not compatible with the EU treaties, the member state(s) 
concerned have to take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities. When 
interpreting the principle, the Court nevertheless found that the provisions that form the 
very foundations of the treaty, namely the protection of fundamental rights, cannot be 
challenged by 307 TEC.40 
 
                                                 
 
36
 Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, ECR 585 (1964), see also Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen, Case 26/62, ECR 1 (1963) 
37
Ibid, p. 594 
38
 See TFEU, note 25 
39
 Attorney General v. Burgoa, C-812/79, (1980)  E.C.R. 1-27-87 
40Kadi and Al Barakaat Int’l Foundation v. Council, CA02, 415/05  P (2008) E.C.R.  1-6351 
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Regarding human rights treaties such as the Geneva Convention or the ECHR, the TFEU 
article 78, as mentioned, establishes that the common asylum policy should ensure 
compliance with the principle of non-refouelment and the Geneva Convention, as well as 
other relevant treaties. The ECHR would for instance appear to be such a relevant treaty in 
this respect. It could consequently be argued that article 78 is lex specialis in regard to 
article 351 considering the legal effect of international refugee and human rights treaties.41 
Such international human rights treaties have been an important source of inspiration for 
the EU treaties themselves, as for instance in the case of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
in the European Union.
42
 
The significance of the Geneva Convention is further emphasised through the EU’s 
decision to accede to the treaty, on which a report by the Commission regarding its legal 
and practical impacts is due later this year.
43
 
 
As the Dublin system facilitates transfers of asylum seekers by determining the responsible 
member state, the system thus has to be considered against international human rights 
treaties containing provisions that also apply to transfers of asylum seekers. Therefore, in 
order to examine the Dublin Regulation and its compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement, the next part of the thesis will reiterate the legal basis of the principle in order 
to determine the scope of protection that it requires. 
 
 
                                                 
 
41
Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo: Refugee Status: Subsidiary Protection, and the Right to be Granted Asylum Under 
EC Law, Research Paper No. 136, UNHCR, November 2006 (University of Oxford) 
42
 See below, chapter 4.3 
43
 Commission: Action plan on the implementation of the Stockholm Programme, COM(2010) 171 final, 
20.4.2010, p. 55 
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4 The impact of the prohibition of refoulement on the member 
states obligations 
4.1 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
The principle of non-refoulement is seen as a cornerstone in refugee protection, yet there is 
no overreaching principle in this regard, but rather a sum of state obligations under 
different international treaties, some of which will be presented in the continuation of this 
thesis. The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (hereafter the Geneva 
Convention) was the first international treaty
44
 to establish a single definition of the term 
refugee, to provide this group with fundamental rights, as well as establish state obligations 
in this regard, and is thus seen as the primary source of refugee law today.45 The Geneva 
Convention provides protection from refoulement to persons who qualifies as refugees, 
which, according to the Convention, is someone who has a «...well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion...», who is outside the country of his nationality and is owing to 
that fear unable or unwilling to be under the protection of that State, and thus unable or 
unwilling to return to it.46 The definition is based on the situation in Europe after the 
atrocities carried out during the Second World War, where there was a great urgency to 
manage the situation with millions of refugees throughout the continent, especially with 
political dissidents fleeing persecution in the communist states.47 Since the refugee could 
no longer enjoy the protection from his or her country of origin, the thought seemed to be 
that the person should then be able to seek such protection elsewhere. It was only in 1967 
                                                 
 
44
 Although it was based on the 1933 Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, see Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam: The Refugee in International law, 3 ed, Oxford University Press, 2007 
45
 UNHCR: Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees with an Introductory Note by the 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2010a) 
46
 The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150, article 1 (A)(2) 
47
Catherine Phuong: Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees: Conceptual Differences and Similarities, 18 
Neth. Q. Hum. Rts. 215 2000, part II A, p. 222 
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that the geographical and temporal reservations were lifted with an optional protocol,48 but 
the provisions in the Convention remained unchanged and therefore the purpose was not 
just to protect people who have fled in fear of persecution in their home countries, but also 
to try to limit the scope of the definition in order to protect States from a possibly 
destabilizing mass influx of refugees seeking protection.49 
 
The Geneva Convention does not in itself include a right to asylum nor does it give any 
guidelines to the required procedures in the determination of refugee status, yet it could be 
argued that it is generally recognised that fair and efficient procedures are a necessary 
prerequisite to uphold the provisions of the Convention.50  
 
The Geneva Convention then provides the refugee with protection against being returned or 
expelled to the frontier of a territory where his or her life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of religion, race, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or 
political opinion.
51
 The only two exceptions from this principle of non-refoulement is for a 
person who otherwise qualifies after article 1(a) as a refugee, but for which there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger for the country of which he is currently a 
resident, or who has been finally convicted of a particularly serious crime and therefore 
constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
52
 Furthermore the refugee must not 
be excluded from refugee status after Article 1 (F)(b) of the Convention.  
The principle does not only apply to persons who have formally been recognized as 
refugees, according to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), whose task it is to oversee how the state parties apply the Geneva Convention, a 
                                                 
 
48
UN General Assembly, Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 31 January 1967, United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 606, p. 267 
49
Toby D.J. Mendel: Problems with the International Definition of a Refugee and a Possible Solution, p. 5 1 
Dalhousie J. Legal Stud. 7. 1992. 
50
UNHCR: Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), EC/GC/01/12, 31 May 2001, 
paragraphs. 4-5, (2001a) 
51
 Geneva Convention, note 46, article 33 (1) 
52
 Ibid, article 33(2) 
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person does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he or 
she is a refugee.
53
   
 
The prohibition of refoulement is of the utmost importance as it guarantees that the rights 
of the Convention can be carried out effectively. Without the principle of non-refoulement 
it could be argued that the rights of the Geneva Convention would be illusory, since the 
host state could simply expel the refugee and thus in effect prohibit him from access to any 
other rights proscribed by the Convention. The fundamental character of this provision was 
also confirmed in the travaux préparatoires.
54
 A migrant in search of protection from 
refoulement therefore has to demonstrate that his or her return would engage the 
responsibility of the sending state under international law.
55
 According to the Draft Articles 
on State Responsibility, which is non-binding, but nevertheless a codification of relevant 
principles and have on several occasions been cited by the United Nations’ International 
Court of Justice, in order to constitute such responsibility one must attribute a certain act or 
omission to a state and identify at least one international obligation that such conduct has 
breached.
56
 The term international responsibility does not only apply in relation to another 
“injured” state, but also “…covers the relations which arise under international law from 
the internationally wrongful act of a State, whether such relations are limited to the 
wrongdoing State and one injured State or whether they extend also to other States or 
indeed to other subjects of international law…”57 
                                                 
 
53
UNHCR: Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (2007) 
54
Paul Weiss: The Refugee Convention 1951, the travaux préparatoires analyzed with commentary, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press) 1995, p. 235 
55
 Francesco Messineo: Non-refoulement Obligations in Public International Law: Towards a New Protection 
Status? Research Companion to Migration Theory and Policy, Satvinder Juss (ed),  Ashgate, 2012, p. 4 
56
 International Law Commission: Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, article 2(a-b) 
57
 Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries 2001,  
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, as corrected, p. 33 (5) 
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After the Geneva Convention the principle of non-refoulement thus constitutes a direct 
responsibility for the sending state A to not transfer an asylum seeker to the receiving state 
B, if there is a real risk that the asylum seeker would face persecution in state B due to the 
five specific criteria listed above. In relation to the Dublin Regulation, which has clearly 
stated its aim of upholding this principle by ensuring that nobody is sent back to 
persecution,
58
 this means in the strict sense that in order to comply with the Convention, a 
member state cannot transfer an asylum seeker to another member state if the individual 
concerned would face persecution there. According to the UNHCR this also includes 
rejection at the frontier, interception and indirect refoulement,
59
 which will be examined 
further below. 
 In a European context it has been argued that refoulement is seen in particular as “… 
summary reconduction to the frontier of those discovered to have entered illegally and 
summary refusal of admission of those without valid papers…” and consequently has to be 
distinguished from expulsion or deportation.
60
 
Furthermore, the Geneva Convention and its prohibition of refoulement is not the only 
international treaty which proscribes obligations to the member states and, as will be 
argued, the EU institutions themselves. After the standards of the Geneva Convention, 
several other international and regional human rights treaties have expressed the principle 
of non-refoulement,61 yet the principle will only be assessed after the conventions which 
could be said to have direct impact or influence on the responsibilities of the member states 
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and the implementation of the Regulation. The development of direct and indirect 
refoulement after the ECHR and its consequences and impact on the Dublin Regulation, 
including an analysis of the relevant case law, will thus be carried out in order to examine 
the responsibilities of the member states when transferring asylum seekers pursuant to the 
Regulation. 
 
4.2 The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
In Europe, the ECHR has emerged as perhaps the most important regional treaty for the 
protection of human rights, and will therefore have special emphasis when considering 
legal acts of the European Union. Unlike the Geneva Convention, everyone can seek 
protection of their rights under the ECHR, given of course that the right in question is 
protected in the Convention, and as long as they are under the jurisdiction of a contracting 
party.62 The Convention does not explicitly contain any prohibition of refoulement nor does 
it guarantee the right to asylum in any of its articles. It could rather be argued that the 
principle is incorporated in the Convention through the case law of the ECtHR. Being the 
monitoring mechanism of the ECHR, the ECtHR affirmed already in 1978 in the case of 
Tyrer v. United Kingdom63 that it intended to interpret the Convention evolutionary, as the 
Court stated that the ECHR was a “…living instrument…” which had to be interpreted in 
the light of “…present-day conditions”.64   
The Court has continued using this method of evolutionary or dynamic interpretation, and 
was thus able to establish the concept of an implied principle of non-refoulement under 
article 3 for the first time in the case of Soering v. United Kingdom.65 
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4.2.1 Establishing the concept of implied non-refoulement 
In the Soering case, a German national, Jens Soering, was imprisoned in the U.K. facing 
extradition to the U.S. where he would be trialled for murder where the maximum sentence 
was the death penalty. The applicant claimed that if he was sentenced to death, he would be 
exposed to the so-called “death row phenomenon” which allegedly amounted to breaching 
article 3, which provides that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”66 The judgment did therefore not concern an asylum 
seeker, but nevertheless had, as will be argued, great impact on the rights of asylum seekers 
in Europe. The question the Court then had to consider in the Soering case was whether the 
extradition of the applicant to a state where he would be subjected or likely to be subjected 
to torture, inhumane treatment or degrading punishment would in itself engage the 
responsibility of a contracting state under article 3. The ECtHR expressed that the 
interpretation of the ECHR had to be conducted with regard to its special character as a 
treaty protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms, and given the absolute nature of 
article 3, the Court found that:  
 
“Extradition in such circumstances, while not explicitly referred to in the brief and general 
wording of Article 3 [...] would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of the 
Article, and in the Court’s view this inherent obligation not to extradite also extends to 
cases in which the fugitive would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article.”67 
 
The Court consequently established a responsibility for the contracting states not only for 
actions on their own territory, but also for actions by the sending state which has the direct 
consequence of placing an individual at risk of treatment in violation of article 3 in another 
state,
68
 a principle that appears to be in line with the prohibition of non-refoulement in the 
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International Convention against Torture and Other Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT) article 3.
69
 According to CAT, “no State Party shall expel, return 
(“refouler”) or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”70 In the assessment of 
whether such “substantial grounds” exists, the competent authorities must take into account 
all relevant considerations including if there is “a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or 
mass violations of human rights”71 in the state concerned. This provision must be 
considered in the light of the purpose of the Convention, namely the prohibition of torture, 
which according to article 2 (2) is an absolute right from which there can be no derogation.  
 
The legal basis for the assessment in CAT and the ECHR is therefore different from how 
the principle is materialized in the Geneva Convention. The principle in CAT and ECHR is 
based on protection from torture and other ill-treatment, while the principle in the Geneva 
Convention is protection from persecution and the threat against the refugee’s life or 
freedom based on her refugee status and the concerned individual’s belonging to a 
particular social group, her religion, political opinion, race or nationality. However, the 
prohibition of refolement after the ECHR is extended further than that of the CAT, as after 
the wording of CAT article 3, the provision appears to only include acts that amount to 
torture, not other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, while this is 
included in the protection provided by the ECHR. 
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4.2.2 The scope of protection 
A few years later, the ECtHR upheld the approach taken in the Soering judgment first in 
the case of Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden
72
  and then in the case of Vilvarajah and 
others v. United Kingdom.
73
 In the latter, the Court expressed that albeit every state has the 
right to control the entry, residence and expulsion of aliens,
74
 refoulement constituted a 
breach of article 3 if there was shown substantial grounds for believing that the applicant 
concerned faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in the country to which he was returned. The Court also held that 
such a non-refoulement principle had an absolute character, hence “...the Court’s 
examination of the existence of a risk of ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 [...] at the 
relevant time must necessarily be a rigorous one in view of the absolute character of this 
provision and the fact that it enshrines one of the fundamental values of the democratic 
societies making up the Council of Europe.”75 
In the case of Chahal v. United Kingdom, the Court even stated that there were no 
provisions for exceptions or derogation from article 3 irrespective of the applicant’s 
conduct and that the protection afforded by the article is thus wider than that provided by 
articles 32 and 33 of the Geneva Convention.
76
  
Furthermore the threat of torture or ill-treatment does not have to originate from state 
officials in the receiving state; the Court has also confirmed that the threat can come from 
non-state agents, but with the added condition that the government then cannot obviate the 
risk by providing appropriate protection.
77
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The applicant must however be able to establish that there are substantial grounds for 
believing there is a real risk of ill-treatment, which must moreover reach a minimum level 
of severity. 
 
Furthermore, in the first case concerning the Dublin system, which will be analysed further 
in connection with the issues relating to mutual trust in chapter 5.1, the Court found that the 
indirect violation of the principle of non-refoulement, meaning the removal to an 
intermediary country where the applicant could risk further arbitrary refoulement would 
also be a violation of the sending state’s obligations after the Convention.78 This therefore 
corresponds with how the UNHCR interprets the principle as mentioned in chapter 4.1. 
 
The Dublin Regulation does moreover rely on that there can be established some form of 
contact between the asylum seeker and the member state before the obligation to examine 
the application arises. The Regulation, as well as the ECHR and other international human 
rights treaties, depends on that the individual is within the state’s jurisdiction. After the 
Dublin Regulation this means that the applicant has to reach the member state’s border,79 
which appears to allow member states to evade their responsibilities if they can prevent 
asylum seekers from arriving at their borders in the first place. Several EU member states 
have therefore been criticised for carrying out border controls on the high seas and even in 
the territorial waters of third-countries, aiming at intercepting boats attempting to reach 
Europe and forcing them to return or diverting them back to North African states, as well as 
entering into bilateral agreements with such third-countries on migration control.
80
   
A recent case before the ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy,
81
 concerned Italy’s 
interception of a migrant vessel outside Lampedusa and the subsequent direct return of the 
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migrants to Libya, without providing information or examining whether the applicants 
onboard were in actual need of international protection. The Court ruled that albeit the 
applicants had not physically reached the Italian border, the Italian authorities had, through 
intercepting and transferring the applicants back to Libya, exercised exclusive de facto and 
de jure control over the applicants and consequently exercised jurisdiction in the meaning 
of the Convention.
82
  The Court, reiterating the absolute character of article 3, ruled that the 
Italian authorities had violated that article both because of the return to Libya itself exposed 
the applicants to the risk of degrading treatment contrary to article 3, and because of the 
risk of arbitrary further refoulement.
83
 
 
The prohibition of refoulement is therefore part of the protection from torture and other ill-
treatment after article 3 of the ECHR, yet the question then remains if also other provisions 
of the Convention, such as for instance the right to freedom of expression, would engage 
the same responsibility? In the Geneva Convention the protection from refoulement is 
extended to the threat of “life and freedom”, whereas the ECtHR stated already in the 
Soering case that: 
 
“Article 1 [...] cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect that, 
notwithstanding its extradition obligations, a Contracting State may not surrender an 
individual unless satisfied that the conditions awaiting him in the country of destination are 
in full accord with each of the safeguards of the Convention.”84  
 
This was also shown in the case of J.E.D. v. United Kingdom, where the applicant claimed 
that his expulsion to the Ivory Coast would violate his right to freedom of expression after 
article 10, while the Court however held that deportation of an alien pursuant to 
immigration controls did not constitute an interference with the rights guaranteed under 
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that article.
85
 This difference might be explained by the fundamental character of the 
prohibition of torture under article 3, expressed for instance in article 15 of the Convention 
which determines that the rights of the Convention can temporarily be set aside in times of 
war or public emergency, yet there can under no circumstances be derogated from article 3.  
However, in the case of D. United Kingdom
86
 the Court appears to have left the question 
open as to whether expulsion in some cases could constitute violation of articles 2 and 8 of 
the ECHR.
87
 It later confirmed that refoulement could constitute breach of article 2,
88
 as 
well as opened for the possibility that in exceptional cases it could be considered under 
article 6 regarding the risk of a “… flagrant denial of a fair trial.”89 
 
The ECtHR therefore appears to interpret the principle of non-refoulement primarily in 
connection with article 3, which the sending states pursuant to the Dublin Regulation thus 
have to act in accordance with, as the member states are also contracting parties of the 
ECHR. However, the Convention furthermore require the contracting parties to consider all 
circumstances in each particular case, where in exceptional situations expelling or returning 
a third-country national could lead to infringement of the individual’s fundamental rights 
pursuant to other provisions than article 3 as well. 
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4.2.3 The impact of the European Convention of Human Rights on European 
Union law 
Compliance with the ECHR is important for the member states when implementing EU 
law, as the Convention has not only been of great influence on Union legislation itself, but 
also became formally part of the general principles of EU law with the entry into force of 
the Maastricht treaty.
90
 The special significance of the ECHR was then highlighted by the 
ECJ,
91
 and in an opinion in 1996 the ECJ even held that respect of human rights is a 
condition of the lawfulness of EU acts.
92
 Yet the same opinion declared that the EU lacked 
the competence to accede to the ECHR, given that this required an amendment to the 
treaties. 
From the side of the ECHR, the ECtHR found some years later that the obligations arising 
from the Convention still applies to the contracting parties although they have transferred 
competences to international organisations such as the EU. In the case of Matthews v. 
United Kingdom the Court observed that such transfers of competence can only take place 
when the rights after the Convention continues to be secured, yet the acts of the EU itself 
could not be challenged as long as the EU is not a contracting party.93 However, this will 
change due to the Lisbon treaty, which decided that the EU will also accede to the ECHR 
after all94. As the 14
th
 protocol amending the ECHR entered into force in June 2010, 
another legal barrier has been removed, and article 59 (2) of the ECHR now allows for the 
EU to accede the Convention, where it formerly was only open for states to become 
parties.
95
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The great significance of the ECHR has furthermore been displayed several times in the 
different legislative acts of the EU, where compliance with the Convention was for instance 
an expressed aim of the different regulations and directives constituting the first phase of 
the CEAS. When transferring asylum seekers, the member states thus have to ensure that 
the transfer is in full compliance with its obligations after the ECHR. 
 
4.3 The significance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European 
Union 
Since the Lisbon treaty gave the CFREU the same legal value as the “Treaties”,96 the 
principles of the Charter are relevant to all institutions, agencies and offices of the EU, as 
well as all member states in their implementation of Union law.
97
 However, in this lies also 
a limitation, which entails that a member state is only obligated to follow the provisions of 
the Charter when it could be said to exercise EU law, which distinguishes it from the 
ECHR where compliance is required in all actions or inactions that falls within the state’s 
jurisdiction.
98
 In as much as transfers pursuant to the Dublin Regulation arguably are 
implementation and exercise of EU law, the member states are therefore also bound by the 
provisions of the Charter when applying the Regulation. 
 
Originally, the treaties of the establishment and the functioning of the European 
Community did not contain any human rights provisions.99 However, the ECJ
100
 still 
considered fundamental rights as an integral part of the general principles of Community 
Law, which had to be ensured within the “framework of the structure and objectives of the 
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Community.”101 Although the ECHR became formally a part of the general principles with 
the Maastrict treaty in 1992,102 instead of acceding to the ECHR, the EU instead started 
working on its own human rights provisions which lead to the political proclamation of the 
CFREU in 2000.103 The Charter was the first single text to provide fundamental civil, 
political, economic and social rights of both EU citizens and residents within the EU 
framework, and became legally binding only with the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty 
in 2009.
104
 The Charter is in many ways a codification of the kind of general principles that 
the ECJ already had interpreted to be a part of the Union’s legal framework, and resembles 
international human rights treaties such as the ECHR and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.
105
  
 
The CFREU, unlike the ECHR, explicitly contains a right to asylum in accordance with the 
Geneva Convention.106 Furthermore, the principle of non-refoulement is materialized in 
article 19, which proscribes that no one shall be removed, expelled or extradited to a state 
where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture 
or other ill-treatment. The principle therefore resembles that of the CAT and the ECHR, yet 
extends the principle to include protection from the death penalty, which is not as such 
prohibited after the two other mentioned conventions. In the commentaries to the Charter 
provided by the Bureau of the Convention, which has no legal value, but nevertheless 
contributes to the clarification of the provisions, the principle in article 19(2) is supposed to 
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incorporate ECtHR case law, mentioning especially the Soering and the Ahmed v. Austria 
judgements.107 
 
The Soering case, which is presented above, prohibited extradition of a person where the 
applicant’s risk of being exposed to the death-row phenomenon was found sufficient to 
establish breach of ECHR article 3.
108
 
In the case of Ahmed v. Austria the applicant claimed that his impending expulsion to 
Somalia would violate ECHR article 3 as he feared he would be subjected to torture there 
and that the Austrian authorities was aware of this risk, due to their previous recognition of 
his refugee status. The Austrian authorities did not deny the risk of him being exposed to 
treatment incompatible with article 3 if he returned to Somalia, but held that since the 
applicant had been convicted of a serious crime and his refugee status thus had been 
revoked, the authorities had complied with the requirements of that provision to the extent 
that Austrian legislation permitted. The Court found unanimously that the absolute 
character of article 3 was also valid in expulsion cases, and consequently the conduct of the 
applicant, however undesirable or dangerous, could not be the material consideration.
109
 
The judgment therefore further extends the scope of protection beyond that of the Geneva 
Convention, which allows for expulsion in such circumstances. 
 
The link between the CFREU and the ECHR is further described in the Charter itself, 
where it confirms that where the rights of the Charter correspond with those of the ECHR, 
the meaning and the scope of those rights shall be the same.
110
 This is however meant as a 
minimum guarantee, since the provision explicitly proclaims that this does not prevent the 
rights of the Charter to be interpreted to provide more extensive protection. Moreover, it 
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has been claimed that this provision indicates that the CJEU cannot overrule the case-law 
of ECtHR.
111
 
 
In addition to extending the principle to include the death penalty, the Charter has 
moreover become an important source to understanding the general principles upon which 
the Union is built, which secondary legislation such as regulations and directives have to be 
interpreted in accordance with.  
 
Finally, for the Dublin Regulation, the principle of non-refoulement after the international 
and regional human rights treaties to which the member states are legally bound therefore 
entails that the member states when conducting transfers have to ensure that there are not 
reasonable grounds for believing that the transferred asylum seeker would directly risk 
being persecuted, tortured or subjected to other ill-treatment, or face the death penalty in 
the receiving state. Moreover the sending state needs to ensure that the receiving state will 
not further transfer an applicant to a third-country where she might be exposed to such 
risks. The Regulation is constructed to comply fully with this understanding of the 
obligations after the principle of non-refoulement, however, the implementation of the 
system of “Dublin” transfers has nevertheless displayed significant deficiencies in this 
regard, which will be examined further in the next part of this thesis. 
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5 The presumption of safety and the principle of mutual trust 
The entire Dublin system is based on the presumption that all member states due to their 
respect of the principle of non-refoulement are to be considered as safe countries of third-
country nationals.
112
 In practice, this appears to imply that a member state can transfer an 
asylum seeker back to the “first country of asylum” and take for granted that the receiving 
state will respect and uphold the human rights obligations of which they are both legally 
bound, without making further inquiries into the merits of this presumption. Such mutual 
trust is imperative for the system to be able to function efficiently and is in no way unique 
to the Dublin Regulation, but has rather been a cornerstone in the cooperation within the 
EU.
113
 However, due to the lack of full legal harmonization in the area, there are still 
divergent practices in the treatment of asylum seekers in the different member states. This 
in particular has been illustrated by the situation and reception conditions for asylum 
seekers in certain states such as Greece, which the UNHCR in 2010 described as a 
“humanitarian crisis”,114 which clearly does not live up to the standards required by both 
international human rights treaties as well as EU law itself. With such great differences 
between the asylum systems of the member states, a presumption of safety based on mutual 
trust does not appear to be completely warranted. The “Dublin” transfers to Greece has 
been considered recently in two landmark judgments by the ECtHR and the CJEU 
respectively, which have clearly decided that the member states cannot uncritically rely on 
the presumption of safety pursuant to the Regulation and simultaneously uphold their 
fundamental human rights obligations.  
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5.1 Corroborating case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
5.1.1 The T.I. and K.R.S. v. United Kingdom judgments 
As presented above in chapter 4.2.3, the ECHR has a special impact on EU law and 
complaints regarding the Dublin Regulation have consequently been submitted to the 
ECtHR on several occasions. The first case before the Court concerning the Dublin system 
was the case of T.I v. the United Kingdom in 2000,
115
 and was hence considering the 
Dublin Convention, the predecessor of the Dublin Regulation. In the case, T.I., who was a 
Sri-Lankan national, had applied for asylum in the United Kingdom after his first 
application in Germany had been denied. The United Kingdom therefore wanted to transfer 
the applicant to Germany pursuant to the rules of the Dublin Convention. The applicant 
however feared that the transfer to Germany would lead to him being summarily removed 
to Sri Lanka in violation of several of the articles of the ECHR, including the absolute 
prohibition of torture and other ill-treatment in article 3, as he believed there was a real risk 
of him being subjected to torture if he was returned to Sri Lanka. The Court, by majority, 
rejected this claim and found it to be manifestly ill-founded and that his application was 
thus inadmissible.  
The judgment was nevertheless significant, as the Court stated that the indirect removal to 
an intermediary country, although this would also be a contracting state, did not affect the 
responsibility of the UK to ensure that the applicant is not, as a result of the UK’s decision 
to expel, exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention,
116
 thus establishing 
for the first time the principle of indirect non-refoulement. 
Moreover, the Court held that the UK could not automatically rely on agreements such as 
the Dublin Convention, since it could still be held responsible for actions that resulted in 
violations of article 3. It thus highlighted that it would be incompatible with the object and 
purpose of the Convention if the state parties would be able to absolve themselves from 
their obligations after the ECHR by entering into international organisations or 
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international agreements that did not uphold fundamental rights. However in the present 
case, the Court was not persuaded that the transfer of the applicant to Germany would 
constitute a real risk of him being expelled to Sri Lanka in breach of article 3.  
 
The first case considered by the ECtHR regarding the current Dublin II Regulation was in 
2008 in K.R.S. v. United Kingdom.
117
 The applicant was an Iranian national who had 
applied for asylum in the UK after first entering the EU through Greece, and the UK 
therefore requested the Greek authorities to “take back” the applicant in compliance with 
the Dublin Regulation, a request the Greek authorities accepted. The applicant claimed that 
his transfer to Greece would put him at risk of being subjected to conditions violating 
article 3 in Greece, as well as possible chain-refoulement back to Iran. The ECtHR 
unanimously found the application to be inadmissible.  
 
Although his claim was rejected, the ruling was important as the Court affirmed its position 
in the T.I. judgment regarding the contracting states’ continued responsibility not to put an 
individual at risk of being exposed to treatment contrary to ECHR article 3 as a result of the 
decision to transfer, albeit the receiving state was a party to the Convention as well. 
Furthermore, the Court also reiterated the T.I. ruling when it held that the contracting 
parties could not automatically rely on the rules of the Dublin Convention, and that this 
would apply with equal force to the Dublin II Regulation. This clearly challenges the 
Dublin system’s foundation of mutual trust and the presumption that all member states are 
safe countries for third-country nationals seeking asylum, and thus that a transfer between 
them cannot as such violate the principle of non-refoulement.
118
 In the case, the Court 
moreover argued, citing the case of Jabari v. Turkey,
119
 that albeit such mechanisms were 
acceptable, the “…automatic and mechanical application of such procedural requirements 
will be considered at variance with the protection of the fundamental value embodied in 
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Article 3 of the Convention”120 and that a meaningful assessment of the applicant’s claim 
had to be ensured. The Court nevertheless, like in the T.I. judgment, failed to mention 
when it is justifiable in any particular case to rely on the presumption of safety as well as 
the level of scrutiny required by the sending state.
121
 
 
When the Court in this case concluded that transferring the applicant from the UK to 
Greece in compliance with the Dublin Regulation did not violate article 3, it observed that 
the CEAS regime protected “…fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive 
guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance”,122 and then 
consequently built on the same presumption as the Regulation that Greece did comply fully 
with these obligations, as it had not been presented sufficient evidence of the contrary. This 
was despite the fact that the European Commission had at the time filed infringement 
proceedings with the CJEU for Greece’s failure to fulfil its obligations concerning the 
reception conditions of refugees,
123
 and that the UNCHR, whose “independence, reliability 
and objectivity” the Court remarked was beyond doubt, as well as several non-governmental 
organisations all recommended the parties to the Dublin Regulation to refrain from 
returning asylum seekers to Greece.
124
 
Furthermore, the Court emphasized that Greece did not at the time expel persons to Iran, 
hence there were no risk of further refoulement upon his arrival in Greece, and that even if 
Greece did recommence returns to Iran, the applicant would still be afforded a real 
opportunity of applying to the Court for a Rule 39 measure to prevent treatment violating 
article 3. The K.R.S. and T.I. decisions consequently established that the member states 
could follow the Regulation and still comply with the obligations after the ECHR, but that 
                                                 
 
120
 K.R.S, note 117, p. 15, paragraph 2 
121
 Violeta Moreno-Lax: Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, European Journal of 
Migration and Law 14 (2012) 1–31, p. 11 
122
 K.R.S., note 117, p. 16, paragraph 2 
123
 CJEU, Case C-72/06, Commission v. Greece (2007), ECR I- 00057. 
124
 KRS, note 117, p. 16, paragraph 3 
 33 
it required them to not automatically implement transfers without ensuring that the 
applicant would not face ill-treatment in the receiving state or experience further 
refoulement without the possibility of having her claim properly considered. 
5.1.2 M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
Despite of the result of the K.R.S. ruling, applications regarding the Dublin Regulation 
continued to arrive at the ECtHR, and in 2011 approximately 960 cases were pending 
before the Court.
125
 The system of “Dublin” transfers was therefore considered again by the 
ECtHR in the landmark judgment of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece in 2011.
126
 The case 
concerned an Afghan national, who like the applicant in K.R.S., had first entered the EU 
through Greece. Upon arrival in Greece the applicant had been registered and detained for a 
week before being released with an order to leave the country. The applicant then travelled 
to Belgium where he applied for asylum, which he had not done in Greece. Upon 
discovering that the applicant had first entered the EU through Greece, the Belgian 
authorities then requested Greece to take charge of the application based on the “first 
country of asylum” principle in article 10 of the Dublin Regulation. When the Greek 
authorities failed to reply within the two month deadline, the Belgian authorities considered 
this to be a tacit acceptance of the request pursuant to article 18 (7) of the Regulation and 
initially transferred the applicant back to Greece, after finally receiving confirmation from 
Greece of their acceptance of responsibility and assurance that the applicant could seek 
asylum there.
127
 The applicant then filed complaints against both Belgium and Greece for 
allegedly violating ECHR article 3, due to his exposure to detention and his dire living 
conditions in Greece, as well as the deficiencies of the procedure in his case. The Grand 
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Chamber of the Court concluded by clear majority, at some points even unanimously, that 
both countries had violated their obligations under article 3 and article 13. 
 
The Court first examined the claim regarding his detention in Greece, where it held that 
albeit detention accompanied by appropriate safeguards was acceptable to prevent unlawful 
immigration, the conditions of the detention the applicant had experienced was 
unacceptable.
128
 It also noted that this systematic placement of asylum seekers in detention 
centers in which the conditions amounted to degrading had been confirmed by numerous 
international organisations. The ECtHR has also in several previous cases ruled that Greece 
had subjected asylum seekers to degrading treatment in violation of article 3 due to the 
country’s use of detention and appalling reception conditions.129 Furthermore, the Court 
was not persuaded that the great pressure and disproportionate burden on the asylum 
systems of the EU states at the external borders due to increased influx of migrants and 
asylum seekers, which was even exacerbated by the “Dublin” transfers, could be taken into 
consideration when examining the applicant’s complaint.130 On the contrary, the Court held 
that owing to the absolute character of article 3, such circumstances did not absolve the 
contracting states of their responsibilities under that provision. This view has also been 
reaffirmed in a later case before the Court.
131
 
 
As to the living conditions the applicant experienced in Greece, the Court found that the 
Greek authorities had through inaction exposed the applicant to degrading treatment 
because he had lived on the streets without any means to provide for his most essential 
needs, thus arousing in him “… feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of inducing 
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desperation…” which attained the level of severity required after article 3.132 In this regard 
considerable importance had to be placed on the applicant’s status as an asylum seeker and, 
as such, a member of a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable group in need of special 
protection.
133
 
 
Regarding the deficiencies of the applicant’s asylum procedure in Greece, the Court 
maintained that it does not examine the substance of the applicants’ asylum claims after the 
Geneva Convention or other relevant law, as the ECHR does not, as such, contain any right 
to asylum. The task of the Court is rather to consider whether effective guarantees exist to 
prohibit direct or indirect refoulement to a country where the applicant may risk being 
subjected to treatment contrary to article 3.
134
 Relying on reports by UNHCR and several 
other international organisations, the ECtHR concluded that albeit the Greek asylum laws 
de jure complied with the standards required after the Convention, statistically the 
applicant had no chance of being offered any form of protection and that the merits of his 
claim de facto had not been seriously examined, thus establishing that Greece had also 
violated article 13 in conjunction with article 3.
135
 
 
After establishing violation of article 3 by the Greek authorities, the Court then had to 
examine the applicant’s complaints against the Belgian authorities for exposing him to the 
risks connected with the deficiencies of the Greek asylum system and the treatment he had 
experienced there. Building its argument on the Bosphorus judgment,
136
 the Court 
reiterated that the ECHR did not prevent the contracting states from transferring sovereign 
powers to international organisations, as long as these organisations provided protection of 
fundamental rights equivalent to that of the Convention. Moreover, such transfers of 
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powers did not affect the state parties obligations under the Convention, and a state would 
consequently be fully responsible for “… all acts falling outside its strict international legal 
obligations, notably where it exercised State discretion.”137 The ECtHR held that the 
sovereignty clause after article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation provided the Belgian 
authorities with the opportunity to examine the applicant’s claim if they considered that the 
receiving state did not comply with its obligations under the Convention. With such an 
option in place, the transfer of the applicant did not necessarily fall within Belgium’s 
international legal obligations, thus the presumption of equivalent protection did not apply 
in the present case.
138
  
 
The question the Court therefore had to examine was whether the Belgian authorities not 
should have relied upon the presumption that the Greek authorities would uphold their 
international obligations regarding asylum matters, despite that this would have been in 
accordance with the ECtHR’s previous K.R.S. decision. With the transfer of M.S.S. to 
Greece taking place less than six months after the ruling in K.R.S., Belgium however held 
that their actions had been pursuant to ECtHR case law and that the applicant had not been 
able to substantiate that he had personally been a victim of ill-treatment in Greece.
139
 This, 
held together with the assurances of the Greek authorities given to the Court in the K.R.S. 
case regarding the asylum seekers possibilities to apply for asylum there, and that the 
ECtHR itself had not found it necessary to indicate an interim measure after rule 39 of the 
Rules of Court to the Belgian Government to suspend the applicant’s transfer, the Belgian 
authorities concluded that there had been no reason to invoke the sovereignty clause in 
order to ensure the applicant sufficient protection under the Convention. 
This view was supported by the partly dissenting judge Bratza, who concluded that the 
contracting parties were “…legitimately entitled…” to base their decisions on the K.R.S. 
judgment in the absence of clear evidence of a change in the situation for asylum seekers in 
                                                 
 
137
 Ibid, paragraphs 155-157 
138
 M.S.S., note 126, paragraph 340 
139
 Ibid, paragraph 327 
 37 
Greece which had been considered by the ECtHR, or in the absence of “…special 
circumstances affecting the position of the particular applicant.”140 
 
When all the remaining judges of the Grand Chamber however found that Belgium had 
violated its obligations under article 3, it appears that they assigned crucial importance to three 
circumstances that distinguished M.S.S. from K.R.S, namely a letter from the UNHCR to the 
Belgian authorities calling for suspension of transfers of asylum seekers to Greece, the reports 
on the situation of asylum seekers in Greece had become more frequent, and finally the 
possible revision of the Dublin system to enhance protection proposed by the Commission.141 
Although not expressively contradicting its previous case law, the Court also found that the 
interim measures after rule 39 and the possibility of appeal in Greece did not provide the 
applicant with sufficient protection,
142
 albeit this was exactly one of the reasons for ruling 
the case of K.R.S. to be inadmissible. 
 
The Court concluded consequently that the Belgian authorities knew, or ought to have known, 
the risks connected with the applicant’s removal to Greece and that Belgium thus could not rely 
on the assumption of Greece being a safe country in accordance with the Dublin Regulation.143 
It also held that the transfer to Greece and the subsequent exposure of the applicant to the 
degrading detention and living conditions in itself was contrary to article 3, thus establishing 
both direct and indirect violation of the principle of non-refoulement.144 
Finally the Court, pertaining to Belgium’s unreasonably high standard of proof and apparent 
routinely use of “Dublin” transfers without due regard to the individual situation, found that 
Belgium had also violated article 13.145 
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By establishing violations of the principle of non-refoulement pursuant to article 3 by both 
Greece and Belgium in the M.S.S. judgment, the Court provided a significant correction to the 
automatic safe country presumption of the Dublin Regulation. The Court thus clearly 
reinforced the primacy of the principle of non-refoulement over the effective application of the 
Dublin System.146 According to Moreno-Lax the members states, in order to comply with the 
case law of the ECtHR and thus their human rights obligations after the ECHR, the contracting 
parties have to supplement the Regulation with a three-step analysis.147 The first step consists 
of an extensive assessment of the merits regarding the risk of direct or indirect arbitrary 
refoulement to the country of origin, while the second step is to examine the compliance de 
jure and de facto of the receiving state with its obligations under the Convention. Finally, the 
third step requires the member states to withhold the transfer where it is ascertained that the 
asylum seeker would encounter a real risk of indirect refoulement or exposed to degrading 
treatment in the receiving state.148  
 
The case law of the ECtHR thus extends the obligations of the member states in connection to 
the reliance on mutual trust. Not only can the member states no longer automatically rely on 
each other when transferring applicants pursuant to the Regulation, the M.S.S. ruling 
furthermore requires the states to actively examine the receiving states compliance with its 
obligations under the ECHR and its practical implementation. Albeit, as in the judgments of 
T.I. and K.R.S. the Court did not specify the necessary level of scrutiny, it did however 
determine that diplomatic assurances of the receiving state were not sufficient.149 
 
Furthermore, in what is at the time of writing a completely new ruling of the ECtHR, the Court 
yet again unanimously found a case regarding the “Dublin” system to be inadmissible.150 The 
case concerned a Somali national who alleged that her transfer to Italy from the Netherlands 
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pursuant to the Dublin Regulation would put her at risk of treatment in violation of article 3. 
The Court distinguished her case from that of M.S.S. by highlighting that the applicant had 
received access to reception facilities in Italy three days after her arrival, that her request for 
international protection had been granted which had provided her with many of the same rights 
as the general population of Italy, hence her treatment had not reached the minimum level of 
severity required by article 3.151 The Court therefore reiterated that unless there were 
“…exceptionally compelling humanitarian grounds against removal….”, a significant reduction 
of the applicant’s material and social living conditions after being transferred from the 
contracting state is not sufficient in itself to breach article 3.152 
Finally the Court held that albeit the situation for asylum seekers in Italy may have disclosed 
“…some shortcomings…” it had not however displayed systemic failure to provide support or 
facilities to particularly vulnerable groups such as asylum seekers.153 
 
It thus appears as the ECtHR requires the member states to withhold their transfers in order to 
comply with the principle of non-refoulement after article 3 if the receiving state is unable to 
provide for the applicants basic needs, if there is no access to proper procedure after arrival and 
that the reception system itself has systemic failures in providing adequate protection for 
asylum seekers transferred pursuant to the Regulation. 
 
Still, approximately 90 cases are pending before the ECtHR regarding the application of 
the “Dublin” system to asylum seekers.154 
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5.2 The safeguards provided by the discretionary clauses 
Although the Dublin Regulation itself evidently does not provide the necessary restrictions 
regarding the presumption of safety proscribed by the ECtHR case law, it does however 
contain exceptions from the right to transfer an applicant. Regardless of the criteria 
allocating responsibility, a member state can still decide to examine the asylum claim of an 
applicant, albeit another state is found responsible after the Regulation. This is provided 
through two discretionary clauses, based in the principle of sovereignty expressed in article 
3(2), and in humanitarian considerations in article 15.  
 
The humanitarian clause allows a member state to choose to unite families or other 
relatives depending on each other, based on respect of family unity or cultural grounds. If 
the applicant concerned is dependent on the other’s assistance due to pregnancy or a new-
born child, serious illness, severe handicap or old age, the member state would normally be 
obligated to unite the applicant with a family member present in the territory of another 
member state, provided that this family tie already existed in the state of origin.
155
  In a 
recent case before the CJEU, the Court found that this also includes the obligation to keep 
family members together when they are already in the same state and one is facing a 
transfer, if there is a situation of dependence.
156
 The case concerned an asylum seeker in 
Austria, who had previously applied for asylum in Poland, which after the Dublin 
Regulation made Poland responsible for the asylum claim. However, due to the fact that the 
applicant’s daughter-in-law, who was already accepted as a refugee in Austria, was 
dependent on the claimant’s care, the Court ruled that she should stay in Austria and have 
her claim considered there.  The CJEU also concluded that derogation from the principle in 
article 15(2) can only take place when an exceptional situation has arisen, which was not 
present in the particular case.
157
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The sovereignty clause provides the member states with the opportunity to examine an 
asylum claim although it is not their responsibility after the Regulation. This could for 
instance be in situations where returning an asylum seeker is not perceived safe and the 
return would therefore be in violation of the principle of non-refoulement. Originally, the 
intention of the sovereignty clause appears to be that using it is entirely voluntary for the 
member states, and that any justification can be made for applying it, such as 
considerations regarding cost or effectiveness of the transfer. However, the CJEU held in a 
recent ruling that the member states in certain circumstances are obligated to apply the 
sovereignty clause in order to prevent infringement of the asylum seeker’s fundamental 
rights. 
5.2.1 The case of N.S. and M.S. and others 
With the increased focus on the Dublin Regulation and its deficiencies, the national courts 
of the member states also had to turn to the EU institutions to interpret their obligations.  
The first case of real significance for the compliance with fundamental rights and the principle 
of non-refoulement was therefore deliberated some months after the ECtHR’s ruling in the 
M.S.S. case in 2011, and concerned the interpretation of the sovereignty clause in the 
Regulation’s article 3 (2).158 
 
Like in M.S.S., the joint cases of N.S. and M.E and others159 concerned the transfer of asylum 
seekers to Greece from respectively the United Kingdom and Ireland, pursuant to the rules set 
out in the Dublin Regulation. The CJEU, like the ECtHR, decided to consider the case in Grand 
Chamber, clearly displaying the importance of the particular cases. The case of N.S. v. 
Secretary of State of the United Kingdom concerned an Afghan asylum seeker who had entered 
the EU through Greece, but after subsequently being expelled and removed to Turkey, travelled 
to the UK and sought asylum there. The applicant claimed that his pending transfer to Greece 
would violate his fundamental rights both after the ECHR and EU law.  
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Albeit this case was being considered by the British Court of appeal before the result of the 
ECtHR case of M.S.S. was adjudicated and quite recently after the ruling in the case of K.R.S., 
the UK Court, given the many reports regarding the deficiencies of the asylum system and 
reception conditions in Greece, decided it needed clarifications on certain questions regarding 
the understanding of the Regulation before it could give judgment on the appeal.160 
 
The case of M.S. and others concerned five asylum seekers from Algeria, Iran and Afghanistan, 
who had also entered through Greece before applying for asylum in Ireland. Unlike N.S., the 
applicants had not claimed that their return to Greece would violate any of the provisions of the 
ECHR, nor the prohibition of refoulement. The applicants did however believe that due to the 
inadequate procedure and conditions for asylum seekers in Greece, Ireland was required to 
invoke its powers under the sovereignty clause.161 
 
After first asserting that article 3(2) fell within the scope of EU law for the purposes of article 
51(1) of the CFREU and concluding that actions pursuant to it therefore constituted as 
implementation of EU law,162 the CJEU examined in essence whether a member state could 
transfer an asylum seeker to another member state after the determination process of the Dublin 
Regulation even if this could lead to violation of the asylum seeker’s fundamental rights. 
The Court concluded in the negative. When reaching this result, the CJEU first reaffirmed 
that the CEAS was in full compliance with fundamental human rights standards, including 
those of the Geneva Convention and the ECHR, and the directives and regulations were 
thus created in a context that allowed the member states to have confidence in each other’s 
respect of such rights.
163
 Moreover, the Court appears to regard the reliance on the 
principle of mutual trust crucial to the Dublin Regulation’s adoption in the first place, 
consequently finding that it would be contrary to the aims of the Regulation if the slightest 
infringement of the Reception and Qualifications directives could prohibit member states 
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from transferring asylum seekers pursuant to the Regulation.
164
 Such an understanding of 
the provisions would deprive them of their substance and contradict the entire purpose of 
the Regulation, the Court noted. 
 
Secondly, despite the basis in the mutual confidence between member states, the Court held 
that where there are substantial grounds for considering that a member state has 
“…systemic flaws…” in its asylum procedure and reception conditions which in turn could 
result in ill-treatment after article 4 of the CFREU and the sending member state cannot be 
unaware of the situation in the receiving state, the transfer would be incompatible with that 
provision.
165
 Given the primacy of the Charter over secondary legislation, as noted above in 
chapter 4.3, a transfer under such circumstances would therefore be in violation of EU law. 
 
Consequently, where the transfer cannot be executed due to possible infringement of article 
4 of the CFREU, the sending state has to, without using a unreasonable length of time, 
continue analyzing the criteria to determine whether another member state is responsible, 
and if that is not the case, the member state in which the asylum seeker is present has to 
resume responsibility itself. This gives a different meaning to the sovereignty clause, as it 
now not only provide the member states with the option of considering a claim if they want 
to, but also includes a responsibility to do so under the right circumstances, thus becoming 
an obligation to which the member states never consented.
166
 Consequently the Court 
concluded, like the ECtHR, that the member states could not automatically rely on the 
presumption that all the member states were safe countries for third-country nationals to 
seek asylum in, hence the presumption underlying the legislation “…must be regarded as 
rebuttable.”167 
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As to the relationship between EU law and the ECHR, the Court apparently declined to 
answer whether the CFREU provided wider protection than that of the ECHR. With 
reference to the ECtHR’s judgment in the M.S.S. case, the Court simply held that the 
articles 1, 18 and 47 of the Charter did not lead to a different answer regarding the rebuttal 
of the principle of mutual trust.
168
 
 
Albeit the decision provided an important correction to the understanding of the 
presumption of safety in the Dublin Regulation, as well as concurrence between the 
interpretations of the ECtHR and the CJEU regarding the member states responsibilities to 
respect fundamental rights, the N.S. judgment nevertheless leaves several questions 
unanswered. Like the ECtHR’s M.S.S. decision, the CJEU fails to specify more precisely 
which circumstances would have to be established to require a member state to disregard 
the principle of mutual trust due to “systemic flaws” or when a state “cannot be unaware”. 
The judgment did however determine that the member states cannot rely on an 
interpretation of an instrument of secondary legislation “… which would be in conflict with 
the fundamental rights protected by the European Union legal order or with the other 
general principles of European Union law.”169 Furthermore, the Court’s rather evolutive 
interpretation of the sovereignty clause provides an important safeguard against both 
indirect and direct refoulement by establishing not only a right to disregard the result of the 
determination of responsibility after the Regulation, but also an obligation to do so under 
certain circumstances. 
 
The revised version of the Regulation amends the procedure and the circumstances in 
which the sovereignty and humanitarian clauses should be used, as well as clarification on 
deadlines and rules regarding transfers. According to the Commission, the sovereignty 
clause is supposed to be used for “humanitarian and compassionate reasons”, which 
perhaps makes it harder to distinguish between the uses of the two discretionary articles. 
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The humanitarian clause in the recast appears rather to be a safety buffer in cases where the 
application of the criteria gives an unreasonable result which separates family members or 
other relatives.
170
 Furthermore, the new proposed article 17 requires the applicant’s consent 
of the use of the discretionary clause, which, according to the UNHCR, will give the 
applicant an important guarantee that the member state cannot accept to the responsibility 
of examining his claim only due to cost or time-saving considerations, or to facilitate 
speedy rejection of claims.
171
 The recast does not however indicate that these clauses have 
a compulsory element in accordance with how the CJEU understood the obligation in the 
N.S./M.S. and others decision.  
 
5.3 The safe third country concept 
Although the purpose of the Dublin Regulation is to determine which member state is 
responsible for examining an asylum claim, the Regulation as such does not however give 
every asylum seeker entering their territories the right to have their applications considered 
in the Dublin-area.
172
 After article 3(3) of the Regulation, a member state can, pursuant to 
its national laws, transfer an applicant to a third country, provided that it is done in 
compliance with the Geneva Convention. There is nevertheless no common standard or 
criteria after the Regulation for determining when a return to a third country can be 
considered to be in compliance with the Geneva Convention, or in other words “safe”. The 
practise of transfers to such “safe third countries” is thus a different aspect of the issue of 
mutual trust, as the Regulation permits member states to rely on non-EU countries as well, 
without specifying further the inquiries necessary to ensure that the third country is actually 
safe in terms of providing adequate protection for the asylum seekers. 
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The Asylum Procedures Directive, which is also like the Dublin Regulation part of the 
CEAS, does however contain criteria for determining when to apply the concept. The 
Directive considers a third non-EU country to be safe if all of the following criteria is met; 
life or liberty of the asylum seeker is not threatened on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, the state in 
question complies with the prohibition of refoulement in accordance with the Geneva 
Convention and freedom from torture or other ill-treatment pursuant to other international 
law, and finally the existence of the possibility to seek refugee status and hence receive 
protection if the need for it can be established.
173
 A safe third country in this regard is a 
country through which the applicant has travelled or has other connections as defined by 
national law, and where it is reasonable to expect that the applicant can seek protection.
174
 
The provisions of the Procedures Directive regarding the determination of a safe third 
country are not however applicable to transfers pursuant to the Dublin Regulation,
175
 which 
leaves the determination to the member states’ national laws. Allowing the member states 
such an extensive margin of appreciation increases the risk of subjecting asylum seekers to 
indirect or “chain” refoulement which is a violation of the individual’s human rights. 
According to the UNHCR, a reliable assessment of the risk of such refoulement has to be 
carried out prior to the transfer in each individual case, to ensure that the asylum seeker 
will actually be admitted to the third country’s territory and that the applicant concerned is 
treated in accordance with international human rights provisions once she has arrived 
there.
176
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6 Burden-sharing and procedural safeguards 
In addition to the issues connected with the presumption of safety and mutual trust, the 
evaluation of the Regulation, although it concluded that the aims overall had been to a large 
extent achieved, did not only display that the intended efficiency of the system is lacking, 
but also that the system failed to provide the sufficient level of protection.
177
 Several 
stakeholders, such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) has remarked 
that the system is inefficient and expensive, as well as contributing to burden-shifting by 
placing an disproportionate amount of pressure on the member states on the EU’s southern 
and eastern external borders.
178
 Furthermore ECRE pointed out that the system, due to lack 
of full harmonization in the asylum legal framework, had extensive variations in terms of 
the quality of national asylum procedures, recognition rates and integration capacities, and 
that this consequently lead to a situation of “asylum lottery” for the asylum seekers.179  
 
The Regulation has finally been criticized for prohibiting the asylum seekers from choosing 
their country of asylum, that it has increased the probability of being subjected to detention 
and that there is no suspending effect of appeal or judicial review against the decisions to 
“take charge” or “take back”.180 Albeit all of these challenges can to different degrees 
contribute to the arbitrary refoulement of an asylum seeker, there are some aspects of the 
Regulation in particular that are able to challenge the perception of it being fully able to 
comply with the principle of non-refoulement in addition to the presumption of safety, 
namely the lack of burden-sharing and the procedural safeguards of the transferred.  
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6.1 The Regulation as a burden-sharing mechanism 
Although burden-sharing has not been a directly expressed aim of the Dublin Regulation, it 
is nevertheless a matter of real significance for the cooperation among member states. The 
TEU moreover determines that the policies of the Union and their implementation will be 
governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, which applies to 
acts of secondary legislation such as the Dublin Regulation as well.
181
  
Several international organisations have however claimed that the Regulation has not only 
been unable to achieve such an aim, but on the contrary contributed to burden-shifting from 
the some member states to the member states on the EU’s southern and eastern external 
borders.
182
 This was also pointed out by the evaluation report of the European Parliament 
which proclaimed that the Regulation had failed to serve as a burden-sharing 
mechanism.
183
 
According to ECRE, the Dublin Regulation therefore contributes to a situation where an 
applicant’s hope of having his request for protection granted would depend on the route of 
his escape rather than his actual need for international protection, due to the Regulation’s 
reliance on the allocation of responsibility to the member state which played the most 
significant role in the applicant’s entry into the “Dublin” area. This could clearly be 
displayed by the vastly diverging recognition rates of the different member states.
184
 
The Parliament appears to have arrived at a similar conclusion, where their evaluation held 
that the recognition rates of candidates for refugee status could vary for certain third-
country nationals from approximately 0% to 90% within different member states.
185
 
This can for instance be illustrated by the case of Iraqi asylum seekers, which in 2007 had a 
85 % chance of being granted refugee status in the first instance in Sweden and Germany, 
while a remarkable 0 % chance in Greece and Slovenia.
186
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Furthermore, in 2011, almost 90 % of all irregular migrants entered the EU through only 
two member states, namely Italy and Greece.
187
 After the Regulation, these two states 
would therefore become responsible for the claims of the vast majority of those who would 
apply for asylum amongst these migrants after the “first country of asylum” rule in article 
10, thus creating an enormous amount of pressure on their asylum systems and displaying 
clearly the disparity the Dublin Regulation can contribute to.  
 
The lack of burden-sharing is problematic for the Regulation’s compliance with the 
principle of non-refoulement because it facilitates the return of applicants to member states 
whose asylum systems already have insufficient capacities, without adequate regard for the 
consequences for the individual asylum seekers in question. The UNHCR has therefore 
called for a mechanism of temporary suspension of transfers in situations where certain 
member states are unable to provide for the fundamental rights of asylum seekers.
188
 
Moreover, The Aire Centre and Amnesty International has claimed that in its present form, 
without such a clause requiring suspension of transfers to countries unable to honour their 
international obligations in asylum matters, the Dublin Regulation exposes asylum seekers to a 
risk of refoulement in violation of both the ECHR and the Geneva Convention.189 
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Although some member states have already at times temporarily suspended transfers to 
certain member states, such as Greece,
190
 by recommending national authorities to use the 
sovereignty clause in such situations, this has not been perceived as formally or legally 
required by the Regulation and thus enhancing the system’s contribution to the inconsistent 
and arbitrary treatment of asylum seekers subjected to “Dublin” transfers. With the result 
of the N.S. case described above, the CJEU nevertheless appears to have established such 
an obligation, which hopefully will change the member states practice in this area. 
 
Furthermore, the amended proposal of a new Dublin III Regulation accounts for the 
situation where a member state with limited reception capacities or deficient asylum 
procedure experience particular pressure, in which case transfers to that member state can 
be suspended.
191
 Albeit also the proposed Regulation does specify in which circumstances 
such suspensions is required, the provision nevertheless is part of an important revision of 
the presumption that all member states can be considered as safe countries, as well as a 
much needed mechanism of burden-sharing. This amendment has unfortunately not been 
endorsed by the member states represented in the Council, which in the time of writing has 
replaced the option of temporarily suspending “Dublin” transfers with a more political 
proposal for an “evaluation and early warning mechanism.”192  
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6.2 Procedural safeguards of the transferred asylum seekers 
As outlined above, the purpose of the Dublin Regulation has been to rapidly determine 
which member state is responsible for the individual asylum application, and thus creating 
a more efficient system, avoiding repeated applicants in the different member states and 
ensuring that every application will be considered somewhere by guaranteeing access to 
asylum procedure. Connected to the issues of mutual trust and burden-sharing, the different 
approaches to access to procedures in the receiving states can also possibly put the asylum 
seeker at risk of further refoulement. 
For instance, in its evaluation of the application of the Dublin Regulation in 2006, ECRE 
found indications that some member states denied so called “Dublin returnees” access to 
asylum procedure subsequent to their transfer, resulting in their asylum claims not being 
properly considered.
193
 The report focused especially in this regard on the practice of 
“interrupted applications” by the Greek authorities, which allowed the responsible authority 
to disregard an asylum application from an individual that had illegally left Greece and 
travelled to another member state, which then had returned the applicant pursuant to the 
rules of the Dublin Regulation.
194
 Under such a practice, the merits of the individual’s 
asylum application is not examined anywhere, neither in Greece nor in the sending member 
state, thus possibly violating the principle of non-refoulement, as well as the aim of the 
Regulation itself.  
In other member states, the report described similar practices where the applicant found it 
difficult or nearly impossible to have her application re-opened upon her return, as several 
states considered the applicant’s absence as an implicit withdrawal or abandonment of the 
asylum claim.
195
 The practice of “interrupted applications” has since been abolished by the 
Greek authorities after the Commission initiated infringement proceedings before the 
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CJEU,
196
 yet the examination of claims are still being rejected due to a variety of technical 
or formal reasons following a Dublin transfer in some member states. 
 
Furthermore, the current system does not provide the applicant with effective opportunity 
of judicial appeal against a transfer. The Regulation does open for the possibility for such 
appeal, yet the appeal will not have suspensive effect unless the competent authorities 
decide so pursuant to national law on the basis of the individual application,
197
 thus limiting 
the possibility to a point where it almost becomes illusory. Given the almost automatic use 
of the “Dublin transfer” by some member states, the lack of a real possibility to challenge 
the transfer decision is unfortunate, since there can be compelling and legitimate reasons 
for why an asylum seeker should not be transferred, such as considerations regarding the 
applicant’s health, or the reception conditions and the lack of access to procedures in the 
receiving state as described above. 
 
In the recast of the Dublin Regulation, the Commission has sought to address several of 
these issues. Firstly, the Commission’s clarification of the necessary procedure regarding 
“take charge” and “take backs” is an important adjustment in order to prevent indirect or 
“chain-refoulement”, as the proposed provision now clearly proclaims the receiving state’s 
responsibility to “examine or complete the examination of the application” after the 
applicant’s return to the receiving state.198 
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Secondly, the recast provides the right to appeal against a transfer-decision by a member 
state and allows the applicant to remain on the territory while the competent authorities 
decide whether or not its enforcement should be suspended.
199
 This gives the applicant 
valuable time and opportunity to present his case and could furthermore be used as an 
incentive to member states to consider whether the receiving state actually does comply 
with their obligations to uphold fundamental rights. 
Moreover, the amended Regulation includes a new provision prohibiting the member states 
from detaining asylum seekers for the sole purpose that they are seeking international 
protection. The Commission emphasizes that this is done in order to ensure compliance 
with fundamental human rights provisions such as the CFREU, the ECHR and CAT in 
general, as well as specifically with article 33 of the Geneva Convention.
200
 
 
Finally, the proposed “Dublin III” extends the scope of protection to also include those 
seeking subsidiary protection. In doing so, the amendment provides consistency with the 
Qualifications directive, which defines subsidiary protection as someone who does not 
qualify as a refugee pursuant to the definition of the Geneva Convention, but who 
nevertheless can display serious grounds for believing that the person concerned would be 
exposed to the risk of suffering “serious harm” if he is returned to his country of origin.201 
 
The recast version of the Dublin Regulation does therefore provide significant 
improvements to the procedural safeguards of those who are transferred, and the guarantee 
of continued or re-opening of the applicant’s claim after arrival in the receiving state 
appears to be a necessary prerequisite for the sending state to ensure that no one is 
subjected to indirect refoulement because of its decision to transfer. 
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7 Conclusions 
As a cornerstone in the construction of the CEAS, the Dublin Regulation is an instrument 
that aspires to provide efficiency and rapid allocation of responsibility among the member 
states in asylum matters, while simultaneously upholding and respecting fundamental 
human rights provisions. While an admirable intention, this thesis has argued that the 
Regulation has certain systemic flaws which have resulted in the member states violation of 
their obligations proscribed by the principle of non-refoulement after fundamental human 
rights provisions. According to the human rights treaties supplementing secondary EU 
legislation such as the Regulation, the member states have a positive obligation to not 
transfer an applicant to another member state if the applicant could risk being subjected to 
torture, persecution or other ill-treatment after being transferred, either directly in the 
receiving state or indirectly due to further refoulement to a third state. Albeit the provisions 
of the Regulation satisfy the human rights standards provided by the ECHR and the Geneva 
Convention de jure, it has been argued that the Regulation regardless can have an 
unfortunate impact in practice. In particular, the compliance with the principle of non-
refoulement has been challenged by the Regulation’s underlying confidence in the principle 
of mutual trust, as well as lack of burden-sharing and absence of sufficient procedural 
safeguards protecting those who are transferred. Due to the almost automatic reliance on 
the member states ability to provide equal and adequate protection, it could be argued that 
the Regulation has been built on a presumption of a level of harmonization that simply does 
not exist.
202
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The recent case law of both the CJEU and the ECtHR has clearly showed that not only does 
the Dublin system appear to fail to create a system of solidarity and fair sharing of 
responsibility, but even worse the routine use of transfers has contributed to the member 
states’ violation of fundamental human rights. 
In this regard, substantive corrections to the understanding of the Regulation and its 
implementation by the member states have been provided by the ECtHR and the CJEU, 
which has limited the possibility to rely on mutual trust and required the member states to 
actually examine whether the receiving state de facto complies with its obligations. 
This applies perhaps especially to the CJEU’s rather dynamic interpretation of the 
sovereignty clause, which provides an important safeguard against both indirect and direct 
refoulement where the EU legislators apparently have failed to do so, by establishing not 
only a right to disregard the result of the determination of responsibility after the 
Regulation, but also an obligation to do so under certain circumstances. 
 
However, both Courts have failed to sufficiently clarify when it is justifiable in any 
particular case to rely on the presumption of safety, as well as the level of scrutiny required 
by the sending state, consequently leaving certain issues unresolved. The challenge of the 
reliance on mutual trust furthermore applies to the concept of the “safe third country”, 
which allows member states to transfer applicants to non-EU countries as well, without 
specifying further the inquiries necessary to ensure that the third country is actually safe in 
terms of providing adequate protection and access to asylum procedures for the incoming 
asylum seekers. 
Consequently, this thesis has argued that the current Dublin II Regulation apparently does 
not provide the necessary safeguards in order to comply fully the member states obligations 
after the principle of non-refoulement. 
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The recast proposal by the Commission has sought to address several of the main issues 
with the current Regulation, including the lack of burden-sharing as well as strengthening 
the procedural safeguards of those who are transferred.  
Nevertheless, with the recast retaining the same underlying principles as the current 
Regulation, thus keeping the approach making the member state which played the greatest 
part in the asylum seeker’s entry to the EU responsible for examining the individual’s 
asylum application and building on the presumption of safety and similar treatment by the 
member states, the proposal does not challenge Regulation’s character as a provision for 
providing efficiency in the determination of the member states responsibilities towards 
each other, rather than one concerned with providing adequate protection for asylum 
seekers. In this regard, the new Dublin III should ascertain that transfers can be temporarily 
suspended in situations where a member state certainly does not comply with the most 
important provisions of the other CEAS instruments, and provide clear instructions to the 
member states regarding the examination of whether the receiving state actually fulfils 
these obligations. Without such amendments, the revised Dublin III could unfortunately 
become a missed opportunity for the EU legislators to correct the deficiencies of a system 
currently unable to fully protect fundamental rights. 
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